1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

impassable mountain or swamp. The governing authority was foreign, unloved, and deadly poor. None but a minute fraction of the population was ready to welcome efficient government; the greatest part repudiated it as alien to their ways and interests. The 'Iraqis were and are of independent, individualistic character, unaccustomed to control. Faction in the towns and endless tribal warfare had been the rule for centuries. The deep division between town and tribe was itself a major obstacle to uniform administration; to it was added the gulf between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. Such was the territory which for four centuries the Ottoman Government, acclaimed almost universally by Western opinion as the world's worst, had been trying to administer.

The Government of 1900 of which we speak, and its approach to these problems, differed indeed essentially from that of three generations earlier. In the original form of Ottoman rule, which was pure Oriental despotism, all power was the Sultan's. He stood at the head of an elaborate hierarchy of stratified functionaries, and was represented by governors locally as autocratic as himself. Rule was for his sole benefit and grandeur; no law existed save the Shara', capriciously enforced; no limit or appeal restricted the local powers of Wali or Mutasallim. All posts were for sale, including those of the highest functionaries.

Changes in this régime had been forced upon the Ottoman dynasty early in the nineteenth century by its military defeats, which compelled it to invoke European military teachers. And while successive Sultans were led by this necessity to rebase the conception and machinery of Government with a new body of law and procedure and a new class of officials, other modernizing agencies were at work: those of trade and shipping, educational foundations, travellers, missions, modern communications, and a press. To this impact of the West urgency was imparted by the attitude of Turkey's European creditors and the reaction in Europe to the miseries of the Christian provinces successively detached from the Empire. Under such pressures was evolved the half-modern, pretentious, overburdened, needy Turkish Government of the nineteenth century. For seventy years before 1900 'Iraq had enjoyed the blessings of 'reformed' Government, had seen its Administration modified first on paper and then in fact, with every new meticulous Ordinance in Midhat Pasha's revised wilaya system. With regulations to apply and functions specialized, a numerous and influential class had come into existence, the effendis. Neither landowners nor merchants nor divines, they were of a middle and secular class, complacently urban. 'Iraqi by race except in the highest posts, the effendis formed a great part of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Teheran with telegrams and memorials against the irreligion of the Shah, the new Persian Constitution, and the Russian penetration.

The non-Muslim minorities, economically a leading element in the towns though socially segregated and governmentally unimportant, retained their lead in their chosen occupations. To the shock of compulsory military service, first imposed in 1909, they reacted characteristically: the Jews, if they could not buy exemption, determined to succeed as soldiers and plunged into drill and military studies, while the Christians adopted every means of evading it by flight, bribes, and falsified registers. Their European contacts increased, and English was increasingly taught in their schools. The Alliance Israélite opened schools at Mosul and Hilla, Baṣra, Khaniqin, and 'Amara. The Archbishop's Assyrian mission, through Dr. W. A. Wigram, founded a school at Bibaydi near 'Amadiya. The Carmelite and Dominican missions, with their schools, dispensaries, and printing-presses, were active as ever among the Uniates, the Americans among all classes in southern 'Iraq, the C.M.S. among the Protestants of Baghdad and Mosul, while a German school was opened in 1909. Ill feeling between the Chaldaean and Assyrian communities—the former with jealous French assistance, the latter with hourly appeals for British support—exploded into angry controversy on the question of separate status and registration. Many Chaldaeans, it was said, would gladly have rejoined their old community under the Mar Sham'un if only foreign protection were forthcoming equal to that of the Papal Delegate. The first mention in 'Iraq of a young and then unmenacing movement, Zionism, created no alarm, though Zionist commissions twice arrived from Europe to report on immigration possibilities, and a Jewish pamphlet circulated in 1913 urged the bold policy of demanding Palestine itself.

Security in the towns was in normal times moderately maintained, and would always improve immediately under a strong Wali; the sound of shooting by night was familiar but usually meaningless. Detection of crime was pressed with neither skill nor determination. Anti-Christian or anti-Jewish crime or agitation, on a petty scale, was always ready to appear and little condemned. Most disturbances of the peace came, however, either from the desperation of the hungry, whom in times of near-famine (as at Mosul in 1913) the hoarding of food by merchants drove to burglary and murder, or from the presence in many cities of established gangs of criminals. In Baṣra an aggressive bodyguard was among the resources of Sayid Ṭalib; in Mosul and Sulaymaniya leading citizens—Muḥammad Sabunchi Pasha in the first, the Barzinji shaykhs in the second—were served at need by gangs of bravos; and in the country towns dominated by powerful tribesmen, the crimes of the shaykhs'

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

ended in 1923, a demand for participation in public life as equals in patriotism, in intelligence, and in wealth—and as numerical superiors—was inevitable; nor could it long be satisfied by a small minority of Government posts and the usual single seat in the Cabinet. It could count upon a section of the intelligentsia now growing up, upon the powerful and sect-conscious Shi'i bloc of mid-Euphrates tribes, upon the rich, land-hungry, ambitious, and highly political Sayids of that area, and upon what was left—it was not negligible—of Mujtahid influence. An episode of early 1927, the publication of a book unfriendly to Shi'ism by a Sunni schoolmaster, began a sequence of events which involved ministerial intervention as well as war to the knife in the higher circles of the Ministry of Education. The political world was divided, in a day, by a Sunni–Shi'i dichotomy; meetings of indignant demand for Shi'i rights were held in Baghdad and the Holy Cities, enlivened by a wealth of inflammatory stories of Sunni oppression, and the Nahdha Party, short-lived in 1922, was revived under almost exclusively Shi'i leadership. The presentation by the Cabinet to Parliament of a National Defence Bill—in effect, a demand for conscription—redoubled Shi'i anti-Government agitation. Their representative minister, Sayid 'Abd al-Mahdi, promptly resigned, and the support of the Kurds in opposing the threat of conscription was enlisted. 'Abd al-Mahdi was replaced at Education by Amin Zaki, and the latter at Irrigation and Agriculture by the Shi'i 'Alwan al-Yasiri. The Prime Minister secured an adjournment of Parliament in time to save his Government; but it led only to the transfer of the main political activity from Baghdad to the Euphrates. The Minister of Finance was boycotted when on tour in Najf, and it needed all the King's tact and generosity to prevent grave consequences from a violent scuffle which occurred in Kadhimiya on the ever-dangerous 10th of Muharram between 'Iraqi troops and Shi'i worshippers. The two Shi'i ministers now in the Cabinet were both anathema to the Nahdha Party. The latter organized demonstrations in Karbalā and Najf, and inspired articles in its newspapers so savage as to lead Yasin Pasha, as acting Prime Minister, to suppress it. When his action was questioned, he resigned, and in this step was followed shortly by Rashid 'Āli al-Gaylani. The year ended with Shi'ism dangerously militant and the Government gravely weakened. On 7 January 1927 Ja'far Pasha resigned.

The conscription issue was a second dominant interest of the time. The need to strengthen 'Iraq militarily was implicit in its claim to be sole master in its own house. Was conscription the solution? The High Commissioner, consulted, replied in effect 'Certainly, if 'Iraq desires it, but not if it must involve enforcement

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 657 182 Government had in fact, not without lapses, maintained the principle of employing Kurdish officials, other than technical, in Kurdish areas. It now proceeded to reaffirm this and to enact a Language Law in the interests of Kurdish-speakers, to set up a translation bureau, to appoint a Kurdish Inspector of Education for north-eastern 'Iraq, and a Kurdish Assistant Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior. Local committees were next formed to determine the language of instruction to be used in each school, to specify the dialect of Kurdish required, and to replace non-Kurdish-speaking staff. Repeated visits were paid to north and north-east 'Iraq by the King, the Amir Ghazi, the High Commissioner, and 'Iraqi ministers with the purpose of allaying suspicion, increasing personal contact, and collecting such information as would satisfy the still uneasy Mandates Commission. It was possible, at this stage, to hope for increasing coalescence of the Kurdish areas of 'Iraq, and that their nationalism, wisely handled, would weaken: hopes not impossible but unduly optimistic, since the high statesmanship which could have achieved these ends was not in sight. Yet, in adopting a hesitant attitude to Kurdish claims, the 'Iraq Government was not always unreasonable. These claims were at times frankly separatist, incompatible with an 'Iraq State as constituted, exacerbated by the abiding antipathy felt mutually between the two races, and not lessened by the signs of a more sympathetic or more generous attitude towards the Kurds by the British advisers than by 'Iraqi statesmen. The fear existed, in addition, that privileges granted to the Kurds would be demanded immediately by the Shi'is of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question. It resulted that the entry of 'Iraq into the League was unmarked by any true solution of the problem of its unassimilated Kurdish minority. The Government, the British sponsors, and the League itself had to be content with palliatives and hopes.

563 166 657 The same is true of that far smaller, more alien, and still less assimilable community, the Assyrians. Substantial numbers of these had by 1926 been settled in scattered Kurd-surrounded villages in Mosul liwā (p. 158). The completion of this process, further resettlement of the less satisfied, and improvement of the settlements were the tasks of the years 1927 to 1930. The High Commissioner's interest was shown by visits to the areas, by many conferences, and by invitations to Government to show all reasonable favour to the Assyrians, even though these, by their attitude of grumbling non-cooperation, in part frustrated the efforts of their well-wishers. A well-qualified Settlement Officer was employed, more villages cleared and reoccupied in the Ḥarir area of Rawanduz qaḍhā, advances of seed and money given to the reluctant settlers.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

1. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

182 563 795 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development, and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

565 184 as speakers and writers, this element which aspired increasingly to the leadership of the nation contained a number of able, sincere, and progressive men; but too large a proportion showed also the defects of the 'Iraqi political character—emotional hastiness, irresponsibility, egoism—and in spite of their claim to be the 'enlightened' they seemed at present not greatly to excel the 'old school' in disinterestedness or in wisdom. The 'old school', meanwhile, the ruling and minister-providing order which held most of the power in 1932, derived from the wealthier Sunni families of the greater cities, landowning or otherwise: from the ranks of senior ex-officials, who often belonged also to these families, and from the higher ex-officers, who rarely did so: and from a small class of rich Shi'i notables. These in all formed a body of established and experienced men of the world. Devoted often to sectional interests, they were not incapable of transcending them, and while willing to accept democratic forms they were reluctant to welcome disturbing elements from outside or from below.

182 Such elements composed the 'Iraqi political public of 1932, or claimed to lead it. Future years must reveal how far they could be reconciled, absorbed, or proved capable of self-subordination. Meanwhile, with material enough for divided councils, intrigue and faction, and for personal interests and ambitions, there were important unifying factors also, in addition to the general bonds of common religion, culture, and citizenship. All the public alike had been subject to the mandatory régime, with its control and its well-intentioned counsels—and almost all had, to some degree, reacted against it. In the future, with the passing of the direct control which Great Britain had exercised, the services of a few British servants of the 'Iraq Government would remain to be used in whatever manner and degree 'Iraqis might approve. The help of the British Ambassador,[1] successor to the High Commissioner, was equally to be available to future 'Iraqi Prime Ministers. These were and had long been factors of stability and continuity. Another had been the monarchy itself; and there was in 1932 no expectation

[1] British Ambassadors to 'Iraq in the period 1932–51 (all of whom are mentioned in the text) were: Sir Francis Humphrys, 1932–5, having been High Commissioner since 1929: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 1935–8: Sir Maurice Peterson, 1938–9: Sir Basil Newton, 1939–41: Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (ex-Adviser to Interior, 1921–35), 1941–5: Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird, 1945–7: Sir Henry Mack, 1947–50: Sir John Troutbeck, 1951.

The services rendered to 'Iraq by senior members of their staffs were in some cases very appreciable, though entirely unknown to the public. Those who held the position of Counsellor—and usually acted for considerable periods as chargé d'affaires—were: G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, 1932–5: C. H. Bateman, 1935–8: W. E. Houstoun-Boswall, 1938–40: A. Holman, 1940–2: G. H. Thompson, 1942–5: D. L. Busk, 1946–8: H. Trevelyan, 1948–50: H. Beeley, 1950. Oriental Secretaries of the period were V. Holt, 1932–44, S. H. Perowne, 1945–7, J. C. B. Richmond, 1948–51.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

that the incomparable services of King Faysal would not be available for another twenty years, capable as they were of neutralizing many of the conflicts and unstable features of 'Iraqi public life. That this was not to be was mercifully concealed at the hour of Independence; equally, it could not be foreseen that one of the agencies of security and national unity—the promising and hitherto correctly subordinate Army—was to take the lead in revolution and embitterment.

The most effective of unifying features—though in fact one of division also, since it was espoused by different factions with very different degrees of passion—was that of nationalism, the strongest single force in contemporary 'Iraqi politics. It had taken the form usual in 'new' nations, who adopt with enthusiasm the attitudes of which older, disillusioned countries have already wearied. Pride of country and desire for its political freedom have been generally hailed as laudable emotions, and by 1932 many 'Iraqis had shown ardours of patriotism as respectable as any in any country. But, in common with that of other countries, 'Iraqi nationalism had been in some measure vitiated by elements less respectable. Their friends would have wished to purge it of features morally and materially damaging to it, and to diffuse conscious pride of country throughout the public rather than see it concentrated in a small political class. They would have preferred political aspiration, which used nationalism as its war-cry, directed towards securing a better life for the masses rather than towards political goals as ends in themselves. If strident xenophobic nationalism had been less crudely in evidence, and a broader-based, more tolerant patriotism had taken its place, hopes for sound progress could have been the brighter. It was a defect of this nationalism, reacting against the country's social backwardness and resenting the material and international superiority of Europeans (and, often enough, their airs of social superiority also) to indulge in uncritical self-flattery and distorted history; and it added, as a unifying element, the encouragement of common hatreds directed sometimes against internal minorities, sometimes against 'the foreigner'. The local nationalism showed, save in a few individuals, little appreciation of what Western European civilization had at its best to offer—in tolerance, generosity, true freedom, and equality of opportunity—and little sense of the practical self-preserving wisdom, for small nations, of accepting a friendly place beside stronger Powers. An excessive or morbid sensitiveness reacted instead against imagined insults, fears of interference or suspected moves of 'imperialism'. Wrongly identified with patriotism, nationalism in fact was a field for political competition: the more anti-foreign the politician, the greater patriot. This persistent feature of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

4. WAR-TIME ECONOMICS

722 511 More even than in political, administrative, or military activities, the dominant and largely unsolved problems of war-time 'Iraq lay in its economic life. This was abnormally disturbed; it was marked by phenomena common in the war history of many countries, those of high prices, shortage of needed supplies, and great increase of apparent wealth; and it profoundly affected the daily lives of the public.

565 511 The chief social effect of these conditions was the heightened contrast between the classes who made money from trade, contracts, sales of produce, and the many opportunities of the times, and those who did not. At one extreme were the merchants—many acting as such for the first time—middlemen with a gift for manipulating licences, Army contractors, and landowners with crops to sell. In the middle, and not unprosperous, were the self-sufficient cultivators receiving high prices and enabled in many cases to free themselves from the debts of a lifetime, shopkeepers and transport operators serving a swollen and moneyed military and civil public, artisans with their services everywhere in demand, and labourers sure of military employment so long as the British forces needed 60,000 of them. The poor were those tied, like Government officials, to fixed money incomes augmented at best by war-time allowances which ever lagged behind prices, and the writers and journalists and half-employed prowlers on the fringe of the professions and of politics. The effect of wealth on the first of these classes was to remove them, with higher material standards and demands, farther from the bulk of their countrymen; and that of hard times on the impoverished classes was sadly to lower the standards among the body of Government officials, and to drive a large part of the embittered and hungry middle class farther—and sometimes very far—to the Left. The structure of [182] society was loosened, solidarity and mutual respect decreased. Politically the discontents and frustrations of daily life were reflected, in bitterness or clashing aims, in the circles of the Cabinet and the deputies, and multiplied the embarrassments of successive Ministries. As in many another country, neither statesmen nor functionaries could produce the firm wisdom or the administrative technique to meet the conflicting stresses of a complicated and imperfectly diagnosed situation, which lasted for five years.

433 439 'Iraq's main contribution to the world's wealth, its grain and dates, continued to be produced with the annual variations due to rainfall, floods, pests, and canal performance. The crops were in part consumed by the growers, in part acquired by Government for resale, in part bought with Government authorization by the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1815-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanageable public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt—gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities.

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial—within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses. The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or 'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature: the loss of Faysal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young State, and had gravely unsettled it.

Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing, and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise, frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement, tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-standards of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of which they were inescapably members, might allow.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 Ml Middle East
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mitted in office. A Higher Disciplinary Board handles appeals and disputes regarding the rights of officials.

The Educational Ladder

The educational ladder in Iraq is based on a primary school, which children enter at the age of six and attend for six years, a secondary school of five years, and a number of colleges of three to six years; there are also numerous professional and vocational schools. (See Chart IV.) The secondary school is of two levels: an intermediate school of three years' duration is an approximation of the American junior-high school; a two-year preparatory school is a shorter version of the American senior-high school. Thus, Iraqi primary and secondary schools operate on the 6-3-2 plan as compared with the American 8-4 or 6-3-3 year plans. Below the primary-school level, a few kindergartens are maintained by the Ministry of Education or by some private agencies.

Public primary schools

The public primary school is free to all children who have reached the age of six years and offers a uniform curriculum extending over six grades. It is the common school which most Iraqi children, whatever their class, religion, or race, attend, and it is the medium through which the educational authorities of Iraq hope to develop a sense of citizenship and national unity. Attendance is compulsory wherever adequate facilities exist. Article 36 of the Public Education Law prohibits Iraqi children from attending foreign primary schools; and as native private schools follow rather closely the curriculum of the government schools, it is safe to conclude that all Iraqi children of primary school age who attend school at all receive a standard type of primary education.

The primary-school course ends in a special public primary examination, set by the Ministry for all the schools of Iraq. No pupil can be promoted to a postprimary school, whether public, private, or foreign, without first passing the public primary examination or presenting a certificate showing that he has pursued similar studies abroad.

Postprimary education

Of 5,416 graduates of primary schools in 1942–43, 4,214 pupils, or 77.6 percent, continued their education the following year. The great majority of these, 3,921 pupils, entered the intermediate schools, while the remainder, 293, entered some vocational or professional school. The boys